Now that I’ve laid out the historical and hypothetical reasons for Arthur going to Bourges (Biturigas), it’s time to return to the events in my historical fiction opener, The Retreat to Avalon. Arthur has captured Nantes, and is preparing to move into Visigoth territory, but treason has ruined the chance of surprise and forced him to change plans. To pull off his next gamble, he’ll have to misdirect the Visigoths, and for that he calls on Gawain to conduct a special operation.
There’s little in the historical record about the details and decisions behind the war between Riothamus (a.k.a. Arthur) and Euric of the Visigoths. Little more than the location where Riothamus establishes his base in Visigoth territory, where the climactic battle occurs, where Riothamus goes after the battle, and a little about the actions of Syagrius and Anthemius around these events.
The part of the story we’re talking about today comes from a tactician’s view of the historical events, and why things may have happened as they did. I described the events and logic behind the sequence of events in this article, and in my last article, I talk about special operations in the ancient world. That one applies to todays article, because Arthur calls on Gawain for a dangerous and unusual mission.
Espionage and disinformation were as much a part of war then as today, and I portray that in my story. Arthur began seeding disinformation early in his preparations. As he described to Gawain:
“Gossip, within any army, is the most efficient way to spread news known to mankind. From the beginning, we’ve harnessed this resource by giving out bits of misinformation that we wanted the enemy to learn and believe.”
The Retreat to Avalon, chapter 9
With the original plan ruined by the treasonous acts (recorded historically) of a Roman governor named Arvandus, Arthur comes up with a new plan.
“We’re about to invade a foreign country where we’ll be outnumbered and with limited resources. Even our allies are unreliable. Our greatest hope lies in out manoeuvring the enemy and directing them into the fight we want.”
“We want him to think that we still plan to take Pictavis. For that, I need a fast, clever force to keep them confused and distracted. Do you think you can take your turma into enemy territory, alone, wreak havoc for a month or so and return to us at Biturigas?”
The Retreat to Avalon, chapter 9
Gawain and his turma (the Roman term for a cavalry squad) were not specifically trained for special operations, but as I discussed in my prior article, that would be extremely rare. Rather, a leader would choose the right people for such missions. In this case, a mobile guerrilla form of warfare, something very familiar to a Briton of the 5th century in the non-Romanized north, is what Arthur needed.
Pictavis (modern Poitiers) would have been the most likely target for Arthur or Syagrius to take, as it controlled the Poitou Gap, the only lowland corridor connecting northern and southern France. Poitiers was thus fought over until the modern age, and four decades later in 507 it would be the site of the battle that finally ended the Visigoth kingdom in Gaul.
Since Arvandus had warned Euric of Emperor Anthemius‘ alliance with Arthur, Euric would expect Arthur to attack Poitiers. Thus, he would have reinforced the city and been on the lookout for military activity out of the north. If Arthur wanted to move into Euric’s territory, he’d have to choose a different stronghold to set up his base.
This, to me, is the most logical reason that Arthur ended up at Bourges. Bourges was south of the Loire River, the physical border between the Visigoths and the Roman rump-state of Syagrius. Aside from this, it had little strategic value for a war with Euric. It had an advantage of being closer to the cities of Syagrius’ domain to the north, and nominal Roman allies, the Burgundians, to the east. It was also far from the heart of Euric’s realm in southern France, providing a defensive advantage in being much further for Euric’s army to march against. But it also made it more difficult for Arthur’s army to make any meaningful attacks against the Visigoths.
Bourges might have been chosen as a safe place to wait for the reinforcements from Syagrius and Anthemius, but I suspect that a warlord bold enough to embark on such a campaign, as Arthur is considered to have been, would not be the sort to be content with simply waiting. At the very least, Arthur would have patrols out to harass the enemy and watch for Euric’s eventual mobilization. And we actually have some evidence of this being the case, in the form of a letter from a Roman politician named Sidonius Apollinaris. In it, he asks Riothamus to look into a report of British soldiers enticing away the slaves of a local Gallic farmer.
Getting back to Gawain’s part in this, it occurred to me that me that for Arthur to move his army 200 miles east, he’d want to keep Euric from anticipating the change and sending forces to thwart his new plan. His best hope is to act as if he still planned to attack Poitiers, while quickly moving his forces east to Bourges. This is not unlike the US military’s “Left-Hook” strategy in Desert Storm, in which I vividly recall driving the nearly 400 miles along Tapline Road in one long day under strict radio silence, even when everyone in our truck fell asleep, including me, and drifted far off the road into the desert . . .
Gawain’s role was a special operation to make it appear that Arthur still planned to attack Poitiers. Any competent general does not simply march his army to his target and roll the dice. At the very least, he sends scouts well ahead to find and map things like useable roads, impassable terrain, ambush sites, safe river crossings, settlements, sources of food and, of course, the locations of the enemy. Often, these scouts would even raise a little havoc when the opportunity presented itself, destroying poorly protected resources and defenses to hamper the enemy ahead of the invasion.
Euric would have his own spies and scouts, and if Arthur’s army moved from Nantes with no evidence of Britons scouting around Poitiers, he would have known Arthur was going somewhere else. Bourges really was the next best choice, so Euric would have sent troops to prevent Arthur from occupying that city. Therefore, Gawain’s mission was to lead his turma to the area around Poitiers, scout the region for a potential later invasion, but more importantly, cause enough trouble to make it look as if Poitiers was still the next step in Arthur’s plan.
In chapter ten, we follow Gawain on this part of the story. He leads his men to the area around Poitiers, conducts an initial reconnaissance, a little espionage, and then begins the deception operation to give Arthur time and cover to move his army into enemy territory and establish his base. They struggle with poor conditions, constant danger, illness, loss of their comrades and traps set by the enemy. Leading this mission is a big part of what prepares Gawain for his future role as one of Arthur’s foremost “knights”, and matures him in many ways, as such difficulties tend to do.
